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Abstract—In this paper, we analyze the secrecy capacity
of a multiple-input multiple-out (MIMO) half duplex amplify-
and-forward (AF) relay network in the presence of one passive
eavesdropper. Zero forcing (ZF) processing is utilized at various
locations to improve the capacity when the eavesdropper is
equipped with a single antenna. The impact of the proposed
ZF-based technique on the secrecy capacity is investigated for
three different scenarios depending on where the ZF is applied,
namely, 1) ZF at the relay and destination, 2) ZF at the source
and relay, 3) ZF at the relay. For these configurations, analytical
expressions for the ergodic-secrecy capacity are derived, and
simulation results are provided throughout the paper to validate
our analysis. Results reveal that reducing the number of source
and/or destination antennas will enhance the ergodic-secrecy
capacity and the significance of this enhancement is dependent on
the particular scenario adopted. Furthermore, it will be shown
that, in general, secrecy capacity improves with increasing the
relay power.
Index Terms—AF relay, MIMO, physical layer security, secrecy
capacity, zero forcing (ZF).
I. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental broadcast nature of wireless networks
makes it vulnerable to eavesdrop information signals. This
has, rapidly, increased the attention to the issue of security in
wireless communication networks. It is widely known that the
main purpose of security in such communication medium is to
prevent the eavesdropper from utilizing the information signals
between the transmitter and receiver. Traditionally, security
in wireless networks is realized by operating on the higher
layer protocols of the network with which perfect security
is not always guaranteed, particularly when the eavesdropper
has sufficiently high computational power. On the contrary, the
physical layer security is able to secure communications even
in the presence of eavesdroppers with unlimited computation
ability. The concept of physical layer security is not new, in
fact, it was first developed few decades ago by Wyner, [1],
and it is showed that secure communications is possible if
the eavesdropper channel is a degraded version of the main
channel. In light of this, the secrecy rate is defined as the rate at
which the transmitter can send secret messages to the receiver
while the unauthorized eavesdropper is unable to understand
it. In addition, the maximum secrecy rate is referred to as the
capacity rate.
There has been considerable amount of research on im-
proving the physical layer security via cooperative relays.
For instance, the authors in [2], [3] found that cooperative
communications can greatly improve security in comparison
to the non-cooperative systems. Furthermore, these authors
studied different relaying schemes to find the optimal relay
weights that maximize the secrecy rate or minimize the
transmit power. In [4], however, the secrecy capacity is eval-
uated over Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
wiretap channel consisting of a transmitter with two antennas,
a receiver with two antennas and an eavesdropper with a
single antenna. Very recently, the problem of computing the
perfect secrecy capacity of Gaussian MIMO wire-tap channels
is analyzed in [5], [6]. Additionally, it is found in [7] that
transmit antenna selection scheme in conjunction with receive
selection combining can further enhance the physical layer
security in MIMO wiretap channels. In MIMO relay networks,
due to various sources sending multiple independent signals
simultaneously, interference occurs at the relays (first phase)
and at the destination (second phase). In this environment,
interference cancellation techniques such as zero forcing (ZF)
should be implemented at the source, relay and/or destination.
The sum rate of MIMO two-way AF relay networks with ZF
is analyzed in [8] whereas the authors in [9] evaluated the
performance of ZF-based two-hop relay networks.
To the best of our knowledge, the impact of ZF on the
security of MIMO two-hop AF relay networks has not been
addressed yet. Unlike these studies, in this paper we analyze
mathematically the security in two-hop AF relay networks
for several scenarios based on the design strategy of ZF, i.e.
in terms of its location. The rationale for selecting ZF, and
not others, is mainly because of its simplicity and ease of
implementation. Therefore, the contribution of this paper is
threefold. Analytical expressions are derived to calculate the
ergodic-secrecy capacity for the proposed system under the
following configurations 1) ZF at the relay and destination, 2)
ZF at the source and relay, 3) ZF at relay. throughout the paper,
simulation results are also included to confirm the validity of
our analysis. The results show that reducing the number of
source or/and destination antennas can considerably enhance
the secrecy capacity. Furthermore, it is found that the capacity
gain is also influenced by the design strategy of ZF being
adopted as well as the relay power.
The notations used in this paper are: Bold uppercase and
bold lowercase letters denote matrices and vectors, respec-
tively. Conjugate operation, transpose operation and conjugate
transpose are denoted by (.)
∗
, (.)
T
and (.)
H
, respectively.
The notation |.| represents the absolute value of a scalar
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Figure 1. Block diagram of two-hop AF relay network with ZF processing
in the presence of one eavesdropper.
whereas ‖.‖ denotes Euclidean norm. Circularly symmetric is
denoted by CN (µ,σ2); log (.) represents logarithm of base-
2; I identity matrix and diag{a} represents a diagonal matrix
whose diagonal elements are the elements of the vector a;
Tr (.) is the trace of a matrix; [A]k,k is the element (k, k), [A]k
is the column k in matrix A and E (.) denotes expectation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an AF relay network model consisting of Ns
source nodes sending independent information signals to Nd
destination nodes via Nr relay nodes with the existence of
a passive eavesdropper equipped with a single antenna to
eavesdrop one specific signal as illustrated in Fig. 1. As seen
from this figure, the channels coefficients between the nodes
are denoted as G1 ∼ CNNr,Ns (0Nr×Ns , INr ⊗ INs),
G2 ∼ CNNd,Nr (0Nd×Nr , INd ⊗ INr ) and h ∼
CN 1,Nr (01×Nr , INr ) . Due to the poor quality of the
source-destination channel, we assume that there is no direct
link between the two nodes. It is also assumed that the noise
at the nodes is zero mean white Gaussian with variance
(
σ2
)
,
i.e. CN (0, σ2). In general, communication between the
source and destination in relay networks is accomplished over
two phases. In the first phase, the source nodes broadcast
signals to the relay nodes, whereas in the second the relay
nodes forward the received signal to the destination nodes.
With this in mind, we assume that the eavesdropper is located
close to the relay nodes, see Fig. 1, i.e. security becomes an
issue in the second phase. To start with, the received signal
vector at the relays is expressed as
yr = asG1Ws x+ nr (1)
where yr = [y1, ......, yNr ]
T , Ws is the Ns×Ns source weight
matrix, x is Ns×1 transmitted signal vector with variance INs ,
nr is Nr×1 additive wight Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector at
the relay nodes with variance σ2r and as is the normalization
constant that was designed to constrain the transmit power at
the source (Ps) given by
as =
√
Ps
Tr (E [WsWHs ])
(2)
Therefore, the received signal vector at the destination is
yd = as ar WdG2WrG1Wsx+ ar WdG2Wrnr+Wd nd
(3)
where yd = [y1, ......, yNd ]
T , Wr is the Nr×Nr relay weight
matrix, Wd is the Nd ×Nd destination weight matrix, nd is
Nd × 1 AWGN vector at the destination nodes with variance
σ2d and ar is the normalization constant designed to constrain
the transmit power at the relay and is given by [9]
ar =
√√√√ Prσ2r Tr (E [WsWHs ])
Ps
σ2
r
Tr (E [Q]) + Tr (E [WrWHr ])
(4)
where Q = Wr G1WsW
H
s G
H
1 W
H
r . At the receiver, the
signal-to-interference noise ratio (SINR) for the kth transmit-
ted signal can be written as follows
γ
dk
=
a2s a
2
r
[
WdG2Wr G1WsW
H
s G
H
1 W
H
r G
H
2 W
H
d
]
k,k[
a2r WdG2Wr W
H
r G
H
2 W
H
d σ
2
r +WdW
H
d σ
2
d
]
k,k
(5)
. Assuming that the transmitter does not have any knowledge
of the receiver and eavesdropper CSIs, the ergodic secrecy
capacity can then be obtained as [10][11]
C¯s = [E (Cd)− E (Ce)]+ (6)
where [l]+= max (0, l), Cd and Ce are the destination and
eavesdropper capacities given by Cd =
(
1
2
)
log (1 + γd) and
Ce =
(
1
2
)
log (1 + γe), respectively, where γd and γe are the
SINRs at the destination and eavesdropper, respectively.
III. SYSTEM 1: ZF AT THE RELAY AND DESTINATION
NODES
In this system, we analyze the secrecy capacity when ZF re-
ceivers are applied at both the relay and the destination nodes.
Assuming the relay nodes know the channel matrix between
the source and the relay nodes (G1) and that the destination
nodes know the channel matrix between the relay and the
destination nodes (G2). Due to mathematical intractability,
we assume that Nr > Ns and Nd > Nr. The weights at all
the nodes are given by [9]
Ws = INs
Wr = P
(
GH1 G1
)−1
GH1
Wd =
(
GH2 G2
)−1
GH2 (7)
where P is the INr×Ns matrix to ensure that the Nr signals are
transmitted at the relays. Substituting (7) into (5), the SINR
of the kth transmitted signal at the destination can be written
as
γ
dk
=
a2s a
2
r
a2r
[(
GH1 G1
)−1]
k,k
σ2r + σ
2
d
[(
GH2 G2
)−1]
k,k
(8)
The received signal at the eavesdropper of the kth transmit-
ted signal is expressed as
3yek = ahWr g1k xk+a
Ns∑
i=1,i 6=k
hWr g1i xi+ ar hWr nr+ne
(9)
where ne is the AWGN at the eavesdropper with variance σ
2
e ,
a = as ar, g1k andg1i are the k
th and the ith columns in the
matrix G1. Similarly, the SINR of the k
th transmitted signal
at the eavesdropper is given as
γ
ek
=
a2s a
2
r |hWr g1k|2
a2s a
2
r
Ns∑
i=1,i 6=k
|hWr g1i |2 + a2r ‖hWr‖2 σ2r + σ2e
(10)
Substituting the weights given by (7) into (2) and (4), the
normalization constants at the source and the relay nodes can
be expressed, respectively, as
as =
√
Ps
Ns
(11)
ar =
√√√√ Prσ2r Ns (Nr −Ns)
Pr
σ2
r
Nr (Nr −Ns) +N2s
. (12)
Based on the SINR expressions (8) and (10), we can now
derive the secrecy capacity of this system as follows. To
analyze the ergodic capacity at the destination of the kth
transmitted signal, (8) can be written as
γ
dk
=
γ
rs
γ
r
X + Y
(13)
where γ
rs
=
a2
r
a2
s
σ2
d
, γ
r
=
a2
r
σ2
r
σ2
d
, X =
[(
GH1 G1
)−1]
k,k
and
Y =
[(
GH2 G2
)−1]
k,k
. Using lemma 1 in [12], the ergodic
capacity at the destination can be expressed as
E (Cd) =
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(MR (z)−M(γrs+R) (z)) dz (14)
where MR (z) is the Moment Generating Function (MGF) of
the random variable R, (R = γ
r
X + Y ). Since X and Y are
independent, the MGF of R is
MR (z) =Mγr X (z) MY (z) (15)
and
M(γrs+R) (z) = e−z γrsMR (z) (16)
Now, using the Probability Density Function (PDF) of X
presented in [9], [8] and the identities in [13], we can calculate
the MGF of γrX as
Mγr X(z) =
2 (γr z)
1+Nr−Ns
2 J1+Nr−Ns
(
2
√
γr z
)
Γ (Nr −Ns + 1) (17)
where J (.) is the modified Bessel function of the second kind
[13]. Following the same procedure above, we can get MY
MY (z) = 2 z
1+Nd−Nr
2 J1+Nd−Nr (2
√
z)
Γ (Nd −Nr + 1) (18)
Substituting (17) and (18) into (15) and then into (14), we
obtain the ergodic capacity at the destination.
Similarly, we now calculate the ergodic capacity at the
eavesdropper, (10) can be simplified as
γ
ek
=
a2s a
2
r |[h ]k|2
a2s a
2
r
Ns∑
i=1,i 6=k
|[h ]k|2 + a2r ‖hWr‖2 σ2r + σ2e
(19)
In interference limited systems, the noise power can be
neglected compared to the interference power; hence, (19)
becomes
γ
ek
=
a2s a
2
r |[h ]k|2
a2s a
2
r
Ns∑
i=1,i 6=k
|[h ]i|2
(20)
Let X = |[h ]k|2, Y =
Ns∑
i=1,i 6=k
|[h ]i|2 and using lemma 1 in
[12], the ergodic capacity at the eavesdropper can be given as
E (Ce) =
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(MY (z)−M(X+Y ) (z)) dz (21)
Since both Y and X + Y have chi-square destribution with
Ns − 1 and Ns degrees of freedom, their MGFs are found,
respectively, to be
MY (z) = (2 z + 1)
−(Ns−12 )
(22)
M
X+Y
(z) = (2 z + 1)
−(Ns2 )
(23)
By substituting MY (z) and MX+Y (z) in (21), an expression
for the ergodic-capacity at the eavesdropper can be obtained
as in (24)- at the top of the next page-, where ψ0 (.) is the
Polygamma function.
Finally, the ergodic-secrecy capacity of this system can be
obtained by substituting (14) and (24) into (6).
IV. SYSTEM 2: ZF AT THE SOURCE AND THE RELAY
NODES
In this scenario, we analyze the secrecy capacity where zero
forcing precoders are used at the source and relay nodes. In
this analysis, we assume that the source and relay nodes know
G1 and G2, respectively. We also assume that Ns > Nr and
Nr > Nd. To start with, the weights at the nodes in this system
are given by [9]
Ws = G
H
1
(
G1G
H
1
)−1
P1
Wr = G
H
2
(
G2G
H
2
)−1
P2
4E (Ce) =
1
2 ln (2)
[
−ψ0
(
1
2
(−1 +Ns)
)
+ ψ0
(
Ns
2
)]
(24)
Wd = INd (25)
where P1 is the INr×Ns matrix to ensure that the Nr out of
Ns signals are transmitted at the source, and P2 is the INd×Nr
matrix to ensure that the Nd out of Nr signals are transmitted
at the relays.
Substituting the values of Ws, Wr and Wd given by (25)
in (5), the SINR of the kth transmitted signal at the destination
can be written as
γ
dk
=
a2s a
2
r
a2r σ
2
r + σ
2
d
(26)
Also, the received signal at the eavesdropper of the kth
signal received at the destination is given by
yek = ah [Wr]k xk+a
Nd∑
i=1,i 6=k
(h [Wr]i xi)+ar hWr nr+ne
(27)
where a = asar. Hence, the SINR of the k
th signal at the
eavesdropper can be found to be
γ
ek
=
a2s a
2
r |h [Wr]k|2
a2s a
2
r
Nd∑
i=1,i 6=k
(
|h [Wr]i|2
)
+ a2r ‖hWr‖2 σ2r + σ2e
(28)
Similarly as in the previous system and by substituting the
weights given by (25) into (2) and (4), the normalization
constants at the source and the relay nodes are written,
respectively, as
as =
√
Ps (Ns −Nr)
Nr
(29)
ar =
√√√√ Prσ2r Nr (Nr −Nd)
Ps
σ2
r
Nd (Ns −Nr) +NrNd
. (30)
To calculate the ergodic-secrecy capacity, we first determine
the ergodic capacity at the destination which can be expressed
as
E (Cd) =
1
2
log (1 + γdk) (31)
In order to derive the ergodic capacity at the eavesdropper,
we rewrite (28) as
γ
ek
=
a2s a
2
r |h [Wr]k|2
a2s a
2
r
Nd∑
i=1,i6=k
|h [Wr]i|2
(32)
Let X = |h [Wr]k|2, Υ =
Nd∑
i=1,i 6=k
|h [Wr]i|2, β = X + Υ
and by using lemma 1 in [12], we can express the ergodic
capacity at the eavesdropper as follows
E (Ce) =
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(MΥ (z)−Mβ (z)) dz (33)
Using the PDF of β derived in [14], the MGF of β can be
found to be
Mβ (z) =
2N
( 12+N1−
N2
2 )
d Z
1
2
(−1+N2) JN2−1
(
2
√
Nd Z
)
N !
(34)
where N1 = Nr−Nd+1, N2 = Nr−Nd+2 and N = Nr−Nd.
Similarly, MΥ (z) is found as given in (35) - at the top of the
next page. Now, by substituting MΥ (z) and Mβ (z) into (33),
we can get the eavesdropper ergodic capacity.
Finally, the ergodic-secrecy capacity of this system can be
obtained by substituting (31) and (33) in (6).
V. SYSTEM 3: ZF AT THE RELAY NODES
In this section, the secrecy capacity is evaluated when ZF
precoders and receivers are applied at the relay nodes. In this
analysis it is assumed that the relay and source nodes know
G1 and G2, respectively, and that Nr > Ns and Ns = Nd.
To begin with, in this system, the weights at all the nodes are
given by [9][15]
Ws = INs
Wr = G
H
2
(
G2G
H
2
)−1 (
G1G
H
1
)−1
GH1
Wd = INd (36)
Substituting these weights in (5), the SINR of the kth
transmitted signal at the destination becomes
γ
dk
=
a2s a
2
r
a2r
[(
GH1 G1
)−1]
k,k
σ2r + σ
2
d
(37)
Additionally, the received signal at the eavesdropper of the
kth transmitted signal can be given as
yek = ahWr [G1]k xk + a
Nd∑
i=1,i 6=k
hWr [G1]i xi (38)
+arhWr nr + ne
where a = as ar. Consequently, the SINR of the k
th transmit-
ted signal at the eavesdropper is
5MΥ (z) =
2 (Nd − 1)
( 12+N1−
N2
2 )
Z
1
2
(−1+N2) JN2−1
(
2
√
(Nd − 1) Z
)
N !
(35)
γ
ek
=
a2s a
2
r |hWr [G1]k|2
a2s a
2
r
Ns∑
i=1,i 6=k
(
|hWr [G1]i|2
)
+ a2r ‖hWr‖2 σ2r + σ2e
(39)
Now, by substituting the weights given by (36) into (2) and
(4), the normalization constants at the source and the relay
nodes can be given, respectively, as
as =
√
Ps
Ns
(40)
ar =
√√√√ Prσ2r (Nr −Nd)
Ps
σ2
r
(41)
To derive the ergodic capacity at the destination, (37) can
be rewritten as
γ
dk
=
t[(
GH1 G1
)−1]
k,k
+ b
(42)
where t = Ps
σ2
r
Ns
, b =
σ2
d
Ps
σ2
r
Pr(Nr−Nd)
. Now, substituting φ =[(
GH1 G1
)−1]
k,k
and using lemma 1 in [12], we can get the
ergodic capacity at the destination as
E (Cd) =
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(
1− e−zt) e−zbMφ (z) dz (43)
To obtain the MGF of φ, we follow same steps used to find
MX (z) in Sec. III. Therefore,
Mφ (z) = 2 z
1+Nr−Ns
2 J1+Nr−Ns (2
√
z)
Γ (Nr −Ns + 1) (44)
Now, to derive the ergodic capacity at eavesdropper, (39),
in interference limited systems, can be simplified as
γ
ek
=
a2s a
2
r |h [Wr1]k|2
a2s a
2
r
Nd∑
i=1,i 6=k
|h [Wr1]i|2
(45)
where Wr1 = G
H
2
(
G2G
H
2
)−1
. Let ζ = |h [Wr1]k|2, ̺ =
Nd∑
i=1,i 6=k
|h [Wr1]i|2 and by using lemma 1 in [12], we can
write the ergodic capacity at the eavesdropper as
E (Ce) =
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(M̺ (z)−Mτ (z)) dz (46)
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Figure 2. The secrecy capacity versus the number of source antennas for
different values of Pr .
where τ = ̺ + ζ. It is found that M̺ (z) and Mτ (z) are
identical to MΥ (z) and Mβ (z) derived in Sec. IV, respec-
tively. Finally, the ergodic-secrecy capacity of this system can
be obtained by substituting (43) and (46) into (6).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section numerical results of the secrecy capacity
for the three aforementioned systems are presented and dis-
cussed. To validate our analysis, Monte Carlo simulations
with 1000000 independent trials are also provided throughout.
In all our evaluations, the channel coefficients are randomly
generated in each simulation run, the noise power at all nodes
is set as σ2r = σ
2
d = σ
2
e = 10 dBm and the source power is
Ps = 10 dBw whereas the power of the relay nodes are varied
as Pr = 2, 4, 6, and 8 dBw.
A. System 1: ZF at the Relay and Destination Nodes
For simplicity and without loss of generality, our results
in this subsection are based on the following Nd = 50 and
Nr = 42 whereas Ns is varied from 10 to 40.
Fig. 2 depicts the analytical and simulated results for the
secrecy capacity as a function of the number of source anten-
nas for Pr = 2, 4 , 6 and 8 dBw. It is clear that the analytical
results and simulated ones are in good agreement. In general,
it is obvious that the secrecy capacity degrades with increasing
the number of source antennas irrespective of the value of Pr.
It can also be seen that the secrecy capacity improves as Pr is
increased. For instance, at Ns = 20, it is clear that there is a
0.25 bits/s/Hz capacity gain when Pr = 4 dBw relative to the
case when Pr = 2 dBw whereas this gain becomes around 1
bits/s/Hz for Pr = 8 dBW compared to the same Pr value.
Furthermore, it should be highlighted that this enhancement
becomes less significant as Ns goes beyond 35.
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Figure 3. The secrecy capacity versus the number of destination antennas for
various values of Pr .
B. System 2: ZF at the Source and the Relay Nodes
The results obtained in this subsection are based on Ns = 50
and Nr = 42 while Nd is varied from 10 to 40. Fig. 3
shows some analytical and simulated results for the secrecy
capacity versus the number of destination antennas with
Pr = 2, 4 , 6 and 8 dBw. From these results, it is clearly
visible that, the secrecy capacity gradually deteriorates as the
number of destination antennas is increased from 10 to 25.
This deterioration, however, becomes more significant as Ns
goes beyond 25. As anticipated, it is also clear that when Nd
approaches Nr, i.e. 42, the secrecy capacity approaches to
zero. This can be justified by the fact that under such a con-
dition the normalization power constants ar (30) approaches
which subsequently leads to zero capacity. In addition, it is
worthy pointing out that increasing Pr will result in enhancing
the ergodic secrecy capacity regardless of the number of
destination antennas deployed.
C. System3: ZF at the Relay Nodes
In this section, we set Nr = 50 and equally vary Ns and Nd
from 10 to 45. Fig. 4 illustrates the achievable secrecy capacity
of this system versus the number of source and destination
antennas for Pr = 2, 4 , 6 and 8 dBw. The general trend that
can be seen from this figure is that the secrecy capacity
worsens as Ns and Nd are increased for all the Pr values
under consideration. The other observation one can notice is
that, for a given Ns and Nd values, increasing Pr results in
improving the ergodic secrecy capacity. It is also worthwhile
mentioning that this enhancement becomes of less significance
as Pr goes beyond 6 dBw.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the secrecy capacity in
general MIMO two-hop AF relay networks in the presence
a passive eavesdropper when ZF is performed in different
locations: a) at the relay and destination nodes, b) at the
source and relay nodes, and c) at the relay nodes. In each
case, we have derived analytical expressions for the secrecy
capacity which are also validated with simulations. The results
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Figure 4. The secrecy capacity versus the number of source and destination
antennas for various values of Pr .
demonstrated that the secrecy capacity can be controlled by the
number of source and/or destination nodes depending on the
ZF strategy utilized. Furthermore, it is found that the secrecy
capacity can be improved as the transmit power at the relay
nodes is increased.
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